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The Tragicomedy of the Commons 
Brigham Daniels* 
ABSTRACT 
Scholarship on the commons focuses on a diverse set of problems, 
ranging from crashing fisheries to crowded court dockets. Because we 
find commons resources throughout our natural and cultural 
environments, understanding old lessons and learning new ones about 
the commons gives us leverage to address a wide range of problems. 
Because the list of resources identified as commons resources continues to 
grow, the importance of gleaning lessons about the commons will also 
continue to grow.  
That being said, while the resources that make up the commons 
are certainly diverse, so too are the ways scholars depict it and the 
challenges it faces. Consider, for example, how three of the most 
prominent commons scholars capture the likeness of the commons: 
Garrett Hardin, a celebrated ecologist who gave us the concept of the 
tragedy of the commons, spoke of the commons as an all-out free-for-
all. Elinor Ostrom, a Nobel Prize winner and a world-renowned 
political scientist, devoted much of her career to helping us 
understand how to govern the commons to avoid tragic ends. She 
showed us that in the commons we often find ways to keep our 
consumption and that of others at bay. Ostrom also made famous a 
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number of case studies that provide examples of where use of the 
commons is sustainable for long periods of time, even centuries. 
Carol Rose, a giant within legal academia, helped us see that 
sometimes an additional user of the commons leads to positive rather 
than negative ends. She explained that sometimes we face a comedy 
of the commons, as opposed to a tragedy. In such a case, the challenge 
of a commons is not imposing diets or trimming a guest list.  Rather, 
the challenge is drawing additional people into a commons feast. 
Echoes of these characterizations of the commons are found 
throughout the commons literature.   
This Essay tries to unify these three stories that we tell and retell 
about the commons. To do so, it focuses on the strands that bind these 
stories together into a single narrative. Quite coincidentally, the 
overarching theme of this larger narrative very much follows the 
storyline of an extended tragicomedy. And, like any tragicomedy, 
this narrative has two dominant strands. One strand is plagued 
with challenges, most of which can be traced back to the internal 
characteristics of the commons––the nature of the resource, the traits 
of its users, the way the commons is governed, and the value placed 
on the commons resource. The second strand is one of hope—that 
through governance we can overcome these internal challenges and 
this inertia. However, hope in this context is fragile. Fortunately, 
even though the storyline is difficult to alter, the end of each 
commons story is ours to write. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The commons is depicted in such different ways that even when 
just considering the classic scholarship on the commons, we might 
have the same reaction to the commons as the protagonist of Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Ms. Elizabeth Bennett, had to Mr. 
Darcy on the night of the Netherfield Ball: “I hear such different 
accounts of you as puzzle me exceedingly.”1 
Consider, for example, how three of the most prominent pieces 
of scholarship on the commons capture the likeness of the commons: 
Garrett Hardin, a celebrated ecologist who gave us the label for the 
concept of the tragedy of the commons, warned us that where we 
find a commons, we should be prepared for an all-out free-for-all.2 
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom devoted much of her career to 
helping us understand how resource managers and even consumers 
of a commons might find ways to govern the commons to avoid 
such a tragic end. She showed us that in the commons, we often find 
ways to keep consumption at bay and made famous a number of case 
studies where use of the commons is sustainable for long periods of 
time, even centuries.3 Carol Rose, a giant among legal academics, 
helped us see that sometimes in the commons an additional user of 
the commons leads to positive ends, rather than negative ends; the 
commons is a place where we find not just classical tragedies, but 
also comedies.4 In such cases, we should not worry about managing 
crowds, just attracting them; not imposing diets and a trimmed guest 
list, just enticing as many people as possible to join a commons feast. 
This Article tries to unify these stories we tell and retell to 
describe the commons. To do so, it focuses on the strands that bind 
together these different stories. Quite coincidentally, the overarching 
theme of this narrative very much follows the storyline of an 
 
 1. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 81 (Bantam Classic ed. 1981). 
 2. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 3. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 88–102 (1990). 
 4. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986). 
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extended tragicomedy.5 And, like any tragicomedy, this narrative has 
two dominant strands. The first is plagued with challenges, most of 
which can be traced back to the internal characteristics of the 
commons—the nature of the resource, the traits of its users, the 
reasons the commons is valued, and the way it is governed. The 
second strand is more hopeful—that through governance we can 
overcome these challenges. This hope is fragile, however, because 
very often it depends on not only building and sustaining 
governance of the commons but also adapting commons governance 
as circumstances change. While commons narratives are likely to find 
both elements of tragedy and comedy, the ending of a commons 
story is not predetermined at the outset and can change over time. 
In Part I, this Article provides three brief character sketches of 
the commons. Within this context, we explore tragedies of the 
commons and comedies of the commons. This Part will also look at 
well-governed commons. 
In Part II, the remainder of this Article shows connections 
between what we believe are comedies of the commons, well-
governed commons, and tragedies of the commons. To this end, this 
Article introduces four types of situations where commons problems 
often lurk. 
 
 5. Perhaps it should come as no surprise given the tremendous success of both The 
Tragedy of the Commons and The Comedy of the Commons that this Article is not the first to use 
the concept of the tragicomedy of the commons. While there are a number of scholars that 
have employed the term, two of them warrant our attention here. The well-known political 
economist Professor Russell Roberts, currently the John and Jean De Nault Research Fellow at 
the Hoover Institution, wrote a working paper in 1990 that used the term “tragicomedy of the 
commons” in its title. Russell D. Roberts, The Tragicomedy of the Commons: Why Communities 
Rationally Choose “Inefficient” Allocations of Shared Resources (working paper 1990), available 
at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/5665/The%20Tragicomedy%20of% 
20the%20commons%20why%20communities%20rationally%20chose%20inefficient%20allocations%
20of%20shared%20resources.pdf?sequence=1. In his article, Roberts introduces situations where 
management of the commons benefits a subset of the community using a commons at the 
expense of the larger community. In pursuing its benefit, the subset leaves additional gains in 
wealth on the table that could be gained if more community members shared more broadly in 
the commons. Id. at 12. Roberts calls this “inefficient” method of using the commons, which 
he saw repeatedly, a tragicomedy. In another article, Professor Donald Elliott introduced what 
he called a “tragi-comedy” of the commons. E. Donald Elliot, The Tragi-Comedy of the 
Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics, and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17 
(2001). Elliot argues that human nature does not necessarily lead us to tragedies of the 
commons, nor does it necessarily lead to comedies of the commons; it can lead to either, 
neither, or both. Id. at 19–20. He shows that human nature is complex and that the predictive 
models often employed in environmental law oversimplify the situation. 
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I. OF HERDERS, SUN BATHERS, AND IRRIGATORS 
This Part paints three different characterizations of the 
commons. These characterizations come from arguably the three 
most important works focused on the commons: Hardin’s Tragedy of 
the Commons, Rose’s Comedy of the Commons, and Ostrom’s 
Governing the Commons. Juxtaposing these three different depictions 
of the commons not only provides an insight into the highly diverse 
ways scholars have characterized the commons, but also provides a 
backdrop that is necessary to understand the thesis of this Article: 
these different depictions are best understood as highlighting 
different aspects of the commons that require vigilance if we are to 
stave off problems in the commons. 
A. The Tragedy of the Commons 
While others had previously identified the incentives that fuel the 
tragedy of the commons,6 Garrett Hardin’s work solidified the 
consequences of these sorts of incentives as a class of problems.7 
Specifically, Hardin looked at resources that are characterized by the 
following traits: first, when a user of the commons consumes part of 
the commons, that user gets all of the benefit of that use; and 
second, the cost of this consumption is shared across all potential 
users. When resources had these traits and were not restricted, 
Hardin saw the potential for a resource free-for-all—something that 
 
 6. Many others have made observations that are similar to those found in Hardin’s The 
Tragedy of the Commons. Elinor Ostrom points out that what is known as the tragedy of the 
commons even appeared in Aristotle’s writing. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 2–3 (citing 
Aristotle’s Politics, which states, “what is common to the greatest number has the least care 
bestowed on it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all the common interest.”). Some 
of Hardin’s contemporaries made similar points to those of Hardin. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, 
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 135 
(1954) (“Wealth that is free for all is valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough to 
wait for its proper time of use will only find that it has been taken by another.”); Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967) (“Suppose 
that land is communally owned. . . . If a person seeks to maximize the value of his communal 
rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork the land because some of the costs of his doing 
so are borne by others. The stock of game and the richness of the soil will be diminished 
too quickly.”). 
 7. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the 
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000) (“Hardin gave the problem a vivid and visceral 
name that quickly captures our attention and tells us much of what we need to know.”). 
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he called the tragedy of the commons. To make his point, Hardin told 
a story about cattle grazers who had the option of adding more cows 
to an open pasture, a commons. Each time a grazer added a cow to 
the field, that grazer later brought the cow home for the slaughter, 
whereas the pressure placed on the pasture by adding the cow was a 
cost that was shared across all potential users of the commons.8 
By identifying a number of situations that had the same 
incentives in place as his story of the grazers and then classifying 
these situations as a particular sort of problem, Hardin brought an 
unprecedented amount of attention to the commons and energized 
scholars by challenging them to find ways to solve the tragedy of the 
commons. Through this work, commentators have identified a host 
of problems that are tragedies of the commons. This scholarship first 
focused on the archetypal commons resources Hardin focused upon, 
like crashing fisheries9 and overproduction of oil fields.10 Scholars 
continue to find new ways to apply the tragedy of the commons. 
Recent examples include overuse of asbestos11 and the race among 
states to hold the first presidential primary.12 
B. The Comedy of the Commons 
Many scholars have studied the commons and, after rummaging 
around for a bit, identified tragedies of the commons—Carol Rose 
saw something quite different. Rather than finding that each 
additional user of the commons gained at the expense of the crowd, 
she identified a subset of cases where each additional user 
contributed to the net benefit of the crowd. Given that what she 
 
 8. Hardin expressed these payoffs in terms of “utilities”—each herder received one 
positive utility every time he added a cow and lost a fraction of one utility every time a cow was 
added to the commons. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1244. 
 9. Rose, supra note 4, at 748 (“[O]verfishing was our initial metaphor for the ‘tragedy 
of the commons.’”). 
 10. Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 914 n.32 
(2004) (“Oil presents a tragedy of the commons to the extent that the total amount of oil 
available for anyone’s use diminishes with overly speedy extraction, or to the extent such rapid 
extraction ushers in other inefficiencies that reduce the total benefits to be gleaned from the 
resource (such as private storage costs).”). 
 11. Francis E. McGovern, Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1721 (2002). 
 12. Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 899 (2010). 
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found was quite different from what Hardin told her to expect, she 
called this situation the comedy of the commons: 
In a sense, this is the reverse of the “tragedy of the commons”: it is 
a “comedy of the commons,” as is so felicitously expressed in the 
phrase, “the more the merrier.” Indeed, the real danger is that 
individuals may “underinvest” in such activities, particularly at the 
outset. No one, after all, wants to be the first on the dance floor, 
and in general, individuals engaging in such activities cannot 
capture for themselves the full value that their participation brings 
to the entire group. Here indefinite numbers and expandability 
take on a special flavor, relating not to negotiation costs, but to 
what I call “interactive” activities, where increasing participation 
enhances the value of the activity rather than diminishing it. This 
quality is closely related to scale economies in industrial 
production: the larger the investment, the higher the rate of return 
per unit of investment.13 
If there is a story that speaks to the comedy of the commons, we 
can find it at the beach. There are many elements of the beach that 
present comedies of the commons: swimming is more fun with 
friends, and beach volleyball and Frisbee require others. As Rose 
noted, “Recreation is often carried on in a social setting, and 
therefore it clearly improves with scale to some degree: one must 
have a partner for chess, two teams for baseball, etc.”14 But perhaps 
the phenomenon can best be reduced to a simple insight (mine, not 
Rose’s—much too tacky to be hers): for those who go to the beach 
to strut their stuff, it requires others to be there to see said 
stuff strutted. 
While the comedy of the commons may owe some of its 
intellectual genesis to the beach, the concept has increasingly 
become associated with intellectual and cultural resources.15 
Certainly, libraries are at their best when they are used; Wikipedia 
 
 13. Rose, supra note 4, at 768 (footnote omitted). 
 14. Id. at 779. 
 15. Carol Rose, Surprising Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1257 (2014); see also Yochai 
Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in the Market Economies, 
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1499 (2013) (arguing that Rose’s Comedy of the Commons has been 
“most extensively developed in work on the Internet and the role of the public domain in the 
production of knowledge, information, culture, and innovation”). 
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and open source software do not even exist without users coming 
together to create them. 
C. Governing the Commons 
A number of social scientists have tried to shift our focus from 
commons resources to the users of the commons and the ways in 
which the commons is governed. The real jewel of this literature was 
written roughly two decades after Hardin recounted the fictionalized 
tragedy facing the herdsmen. Elinor Ostrom combed through the 
empirical evidence and identified unifying principles that 
characterized those cases where commons users overcame the 
tragedy of the commons. In her preeminent work, Governing the 
Commons,16 she referred to these as “design principles of long-
enduring institutions.”17 These principles are much admired: the 
Nobel Committee cited these principles before any other aspect of 
her work in justifying Ostrom’s recent receipt of the Nobel Prize;18 
fellow Nobel Laureate Douglass North puts so much faith in this 
aspect of her work that he considers Ostrom’s design principles 
commandments rather than principles.19 
While management systems that best embody Ostrom’s 
principles could take different forms, an irrigation system in Spain is 
a well-known example that she has provided.20 Ostrom explains that 
in parts of Spain, we find irrigation systems in defined areas, known 
 
 16. OSTROM, supra note 3. 
 17. Id. at 88–102. 
 18. See Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009: Economic Governance 13 (Oct. 12, 
2009), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ 
advanced-economicsciences2009.pdf. The very first sentence of the press release the Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences provided to announce Ostrom’s receipt of the Nobel Prize reads, 
“Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated how common property can be successfully managed by user 
associations.” Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009: Press Release, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/press.pdf. Certainly, this is a 
reference to these design principles. 
 19. See Douglass C. North, Dealing with a Non-Ergodic World: Institutional Economics, 
Property Rights, and the Global Environment, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 10 (1999). 
 20. Note that Ostrom also focuses on particular communal herders in Switzerland and 
forest harvesters in Japan. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 61–69. She also provides an example of 
an irrigation system in the Philippines, which she suspects can trace its roots to the Spanish 
system. Id. at 82–88. 
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as huertas.21 She reports that these huertas have been around for at 
least 550 years, and perhaps as many as 1000 years.22 Up until the 
past century, this water allocation system has worked in a number of 
water basins without the benefit of dams and despite times of 
extreme drought.23 To give a bit of perspective, think how this water 
allocation system was around before Columbus sailed under the 
Spanish flag and before the Spanish Inquisition, and may have been 
around at the time the Moors ruled Spain. This history covered 
times of great droughts.24 The huertas survived the industrial 
revolution, the world wars, and still live on to this day. 
Through these three different stories—that of the herders, 
recreationalist on the beach, and the irrigation practices of the 
huertas—we see very different characterizations of the commons. 
These characterizations, while wildly different, are all about the 
commons. The next part of this Article attempts to weave these 
stories together. 
II. TRAGICOMEDIES: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE COMMONS 
In this Part, this Article sketches out connections between the 
three characterizations of the commons discussed in Part I. These 
interrelationships illustrate the difficulties in governing the commons 
in a way that heads off problems in the commons in the long run. 
This Part plays out the thesis of the Article—that the divergent 
characterizations of the commons are all correct: in fact, we 
simultaneously see comedy and tragedy and should expect to 
continue to do so. These divergent views of the commons are not in 
conflict but rather are threads of an interrelated narrative. And while 
there is often inertia that slumps toward tragedy, this inertia is 
not unstoppable. 
This Part lays out four instances where positive and negative 
futures of the commons coexist. 
 
 21. Id. at 69, 71. 
 22. Id. at 69. 
 23. Id. at 69–82. 
 24. Spanish Droughts Over Past 500 Years Reconstructed, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 2, 2009), 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/12/081217192739.htm (discussing severe drought 
conditions at this time, particularly between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
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A. Unacknowledged Limits 
The first type of situation that deserves our attention arises when 
there is nothing stopping the free-for-all of the tragedy of the 
commons, but the negative consequences of crowding have not 
manifested themselves. This sort of situation is particularly prone to 
occur where the robustness of a resource seems to far exceed 
demand. In such a case, it may seem that we have a well-governed 
commons or even a comedy of the commons, but a tragedy of the 
commons is lurking in the shadows. 
In his classic article The Economic Theory of a Common-Property 
Resource: The Fishery, which served as an important precursor to The 
Tragedy of the Commons, H. Scott Gordon explains: 
During the latter part of the last century, the Scottish fisheries 
biologist, W. C. MacIntosh, and the great Darwinian, T. H. 
Huxley, argued strongly against all restrictive measures on the basis 
of the inexhaustible nature of the fishery resources of the sea. As 
Huxley put it in 1883: “The cod fishery, the herring fishery, the 
pilchard fishery, the mackerel fishery, and probably all the great sea 
fisheries, are inexhaustible: that is to say that nothing we do 
seriously affects the number of fish. And any attempt to regulate 
these fisheries seems consequently, from the nature of the case, to 
be useless.”25 
It does not take much to see that MacIntosh and even the great 
Darwinian Huxley missed the mark by some distance. Because 
fisheries are crashing throughout the world,26 it may be tempting to 
dismiss this passage as nothing more than an example of antiquated 
ignorance. That would be a mistake, however, because we are 
continuously finding that we are exceeding the capacity of resources 
that seemed beyond our ability to exhaust. 
Take for example space, sometimes referred to as “the final 
frontier.”27 It is easy to think that space is a place where no one has 
gone before, but more and more, rather than emptiness, we find 
 
 25. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 
62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 126 (1954) (footnotes omitted). 
 26. See generally, SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE 
ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING (1999); MIKE WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A 
HISTORY OF U.S. MARINE FISHERIES POLICY (2002). 
 27. Star Trek: The Corbomite Maneuver (NBC television broadcast Nov. 10, 1966). 
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conflict in space, and not just with Klingons and Sith lords either. 
Consider, for instance, satellites in geostationary orbit traveling 
directly above the equator. Because these satellites must be spaced, 
there are only a limited number of orbital “slots” for satellites. We 
find countries jockeying to secure a piece of the action; countries at 
the equator have even attempted to assert their control over the 
space above them.28 Similarly, the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,29 also known as the 
Space Liability Convention, along with the Outer Space Treaty of 
1967, set out liability rules meant to resolve liability for accidents 
and harm. The Convention was relied upon to arbitrate fault related 
to the crash of the nuclear-powered Soviet satellite Cosmos 954.30 
There is no way around it; we are starting to see the closing of the 
final frontier. 
What all this points to is that crowding of the commons is what 
matters and crowded is not an on-and-off switch, but a spectrum. 
The crowdedness of a commons is an interaction between the 
number of users of a commons and the consumptiveness of their 
use.31 The extent to which crowding matters depends on the 
perceived robustness of the commons resource.32 
Returning to Rose’s depiction of the beach as a place where we 
are apt to find comedies of the commons, part of what is going on 
there is that beaches, generally speaking, are not so crowded that we 
worry about crowding. That is not to say that beaches are never 
crowded; they can be, and when they are, we start to see the tragedy 
of the commons—no space for Frisbee, no place for laying out 
towels, just wall-to-wall people getting in each other’s way. 
However, this is not the general experience we have on beaches, and 
when the costs of adding another person on the beach are negligible 
(which is often the case), we might find that the added benefit of 
another person on the beach will tend to outweigh those costs. 
 
 28. Current Documents: The Bogota Declaration, 6 J. SPACE L. 193 (1978). 
 29. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 10 I.L.M. 965. 
 30. Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects: Definition and Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 255, 270–74 (1985). 
 31. Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 
536 (2007). 
 32. Id. 
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It is also important to note that when we see rapid shifts in the 
number of users that access the commons or their ability to 
consume, we might find ourselves quickly pushing up against a 
tragedy of the commons in areas that we did not assume had 
problems. As I have stated elsewhere, 
[S]everal factors influence the number of users of a commons, 
including the size of a population, technological change, levels of 
wealth, and market demands. While these factors are self-
explanatory, importantly, increases in all of these factors tend to 
increase strain on commons, yet there are some notable exceptions. 
For example, technology can make it less costly to access the 
commons (e.g., transportation improvements) or less costly to 
exclude others (e.g., the barbed-wire fence). Likewise, wealth 
might mean more consumption or the willingness to invest to 
protect a commons.33 
Furthermore, “technology changes may increase or decrease the 
consumptiveness of a use of a commons.”34 Not far from my 
hometown, Provo, is a huge open-pit mine, the Bingham Copper 
Mine. The story of the rate of extraction of the mine is largely a 
story of technology. The story began with a few miners, but once the 
railroad came to the mine, many more miners came as well.35 Over 
time, technology made mining efforts more and more productive. I 
remember visiting the mine when I was younger and standing beside 
tires for mining trucks that were so large that my head barely 
reached the rim of the tire. Some of the trucks in the mining fleet 
today are almost thirty feet tall and more than fifty feet long, with a 
hauling capacity of more than three hundred tons in a single load.36 
This progression of technology is responsible for transforming a 
mountain into a pit so large that it can be seen from space.37 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. For a brief history, which oddly omits reference to the mine’s incredible 
environmental destruction, see Louis J. Cononelos & Philip F. Notarianni, Kennecott 
Corporation, http://www.uen.org/utah_history_encyclopedia/k/KENNECOTT_ 
CORPORATION.html. 
 36. KSL News: Building Kennecott’s Monster Dump Trucks, One Piece at a Time (KSL 
TV television broadcast Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://www.ksl.com/?sid=22958177. 
 37. Bingham Canyon Mine, Utah: Image of the Day, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY (Oct. 
22, 2007), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=8144. 
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B. Interconnected Commons 
The second sort of problem we find in the commons is the 
presence of complex connections that inevitably result in 
externalities—even in very well-managed commons. Perhaps the best 
way to illustrate this point is with a personal story. 
A number of years ago, I took my family to Disneyland. My 
favorite ride of the day was the ride leaving the parking lot. Don’t 
get me wrong, we had a great time. But we left the park along with 
tens of thousands of other people just as the park closed. As the 
crowd made its way to the parking lot, I saw all the elements of 
misery on the horizon: a long wait, exhausted kids, and a compact 
car. In fact, I dreaded this scenario so much that in the past I had 
stayed in one of the hotels across the street from Disneyland just to 
avoid this very situation. Bracing for misery, we all raced to the car 
and crammed in. 
To my surprise, we were out of the parking lot within minutes. 
The exuberance and thrills the rides had given my children all day 
were all mine in that moment. It was not dumb luck either. I had 
Disney engineers and planners to thank for my quick getaway. 
Disney had built a masterpiece parking lot that allowed traffic to 
easily flow out of the lot—all in a way that was completely painless 
for the driver. Even though traffic picked up dramatically once we 
had left the lot, I determined I would never again patronize the 
hotels across from Disneyland. How could I resist the temptation to 
stay at cheaper hotels further away, and then hop in the car to travel 
to the paved parking paradise that beckoned me? 
Often, when I am leaving a concert, a ballgame, or a crowded 
shopping center’s lot, I think longingly about Disneyland’s parking 
lot. Far too often I find myself stuck in traffic thinking that Disney’s 
parking creation, if implemented widely, could revolutionize the 
parking experience. I have told my students that Disney manages 
potential congestion so well that—if properly understood—its 
parking lot very well could be the envy of resource managers the 
world over. After all, too much demand for resources is often a 
central problem facing those managing not only parking lots but also 
fisheries, rivers, public roads, radio bandwidth, and a myriad of other 
high-demand commons resources. And the free-for-all that we often 
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face in crowded parking lots is a textbook example of the tragedy of 
the commons.38 
Disney seems to have avoided this tragedy. But still, Disney’s 
management of its parking lot might be seen in a dimmer light. Its 
creation of the greatest parking place on Earth seemingly adversely 
affected the public and commercial infrastructure surrounding the 
park. It seems likely that the reason we hit traffic congestion once 
outside of the parking lot is that the public infrastructure was 
designed to facilitate Disney’s parking as if traffic flowed like a spigot 
and not a fire hose. Additionally, if patrons calculate the relative 
values of staying near the park or further away, the restaurants, 
hotels, and shops surrounding the park no longer have the allure 
they had when people could be certain of the misery that awaited 
them as they exited Disneyland. With this in mind, we might wonder 
what sort of future this commercial district faces, particularly if this 
area does not become a great deal more pedestrian-friendly and 
walkable in order to convince patrons that cars are unnecessary once 
they arrive. 
Additionally, despite my periodic longing for the proliferation of 
Disneyland-like parking lots, this might give some pause: if Disney’s 
scheme were widely adopted, it might give people yet another 
incentive to drive. It could reduce incentives to take the train or bus 
and perhaps work to kill walkable shopping districts in favor of 
megastores and malls. It might spell the end of downtowns across 
the country—other than “downtowns” found in places like lovely 
amusement parks that feature Main Street as a quirky blast from the 
past where one can buy old-time candy and have pictures taken with 
some sweaty teenager hidden inside a plush mouse costume. 
Perhaps, it’s best to leave Disney’s parking magic to Disney’s 
Magic Kingdom. 
The stories that have made Disney into the children’s 
propaganda behemoth that it is often strain for a moral ending. 
Given this, we might ask, what sort of heavy-handed message might 
we glean from this story about the commons? If there is a lesson to 
be learned about the commons here, perhaps it as simple as this: 
solving any particular tragedy of the commons does not mean our 
work is done. After all, if an army of Disney’s engineers doing their 
 
 38. See Hardin, supra note 2, at 1245. 
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best work at managing traffic leaves us both in awe of their successes 
and worried about the implications of applying these same successes 
more widely, we should proceed with our work on the commons 
with more than a modicum of caution and humility. 
Beyond this personal narrative, consider a couple of examples of 
commons problems rooted in policy. When Congress passed the 
Clean Air Act in 1970, it saw the problem of air pollution as mainly a 
localized problem.39 In other words, Los Angeles’s air pollution was 
considered a problem for Los Angeles, but not a problem for 
Phoenix. Many of the provisions eventually implemented in the Act 
provided emitters of air pollution an incentive to reduce their impact 
on local air quality. Some larger emitters of air pollution—
particularly coal-fired power plants—complied with Clean Air Act 
regulations in a way probably not foreseen by Congress when it 
passed the Act. Rather than reducing emissions, these larger emitters 
converted localized air pollution into regional air pollution.40 They 
did this by building super-sized smoke stacks that pump pollution 
higher into the atmosphere. While this practice relieved local air 
pollution, it also substantially increased regional air pollution and its 
associated problems, including acid rain. In fact, one of the principal 
reasons regional air pollution became such a problem in the 1980s 
was that the commons solution to localized air pollution provided in 
the 1970 Clean Air Act overlooked regionalized pollution.41 In 
 
 39. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement: A 
Framework for Addressing Transboundary Air Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 421, 
435 (1993); R. James Steiner, The North American Acid Rain Problem: Applying International 
Legal Principles Economically; Without Burdening Bilateral Relations, 12 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L.J. 1, 19 (1988). Note that Congress, while drafting the Clean Air Act, mainly 
cited the need to decrease local air pollutants as one of the rationales behind the legislation. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007). The EPA, however, argued (unsuccessfully) 
that the Act should not apply to global pollutants, like greenhouse gases. Id. at 510–14. The 
Supreme Court’s decision against the EPA in Massachusetts v. EPA had nothing to do with 
whether the Court believed that Congress mainly concerned itself with local air pollution in 
1970 and everything to do with the actual text of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 528. 
 40. See JOHN MCCORMICK, ACID EARTH: THE POLITICS OF ACID POLLUTION 73 (3d 
ed. 1997) (“[A]cidifcation remains a problem in and downwind of the major industrialized 
areas of . . . North America.”); Joseph MacD. Schwartz, On Doubting Thomas: Judicial 
Compulsion and Other Controls of Transboundary Acid Rain, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
361, 400 (1987). 
 41.  See Michael R. Bosse, George J. Mitchell: Maine’s Environmental Senator, 47 ME. L. 
REV. 179, 197–212 (1995) (discussing the political and legislative history of the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments). 
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addition to aggravating regional air pollution, the political dynamic 
associated with the Clean Air Act also created entrenched interests 
with a stake in continuing to emit regional air pollution, making the 
problem all the more difficult to address. 
Consider a second example. The past two decades have seen an 
explosion of wireless technologies that rely on radio bandwidth to 
function.42 These wireless devices include wireless laptops, cell 
phones, GPS technologies, and even garage door openers. One 
hurdle in getting wireless technologies on the market is the scarce 
availability of radio spectrum due to generous licensure of the 
spectrum to technological innovations of the past, particularly 
broadcast radio.43 It is important to recognize that the reason 
broadcast radio holds so much of the spectrum is that the 
government wanted order on the dial. To do that, it divided up the 
scarce bandwidth. Before this was instituted, stations bled into each 
other and listeners would jump around the dial to get a better signal. 
As Justice Frankfurter said, “[W]ith everybody on the air, nobody 
could be heard.”44 Licenses issued in the past to meet yesterday’s 
problems make dealing with the challenges of the present 
more difficult. 
C. Problems of Resources with Multiple Dimensions 
The way that we usually conceive the commons is often overly 
simplistic.45 Let me justify this assertion with an illustrative story. 
A few years ago, I attended a conference on the commons in 
Cheltenham, England. Cheltenham sits at the edge of the 
Cotswolds, a beautiful landscape of rolling hills. At the close of the 
 
 42. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the 
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on 
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001). 
 43. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242 
(2005) (discussing alternative regulatory schemes for radio bandwidth). 
 44. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). 
 45. Daniels, supra note 31, at 521 (“Commons institutions are intentionally myopic. 
The herdsmen looked at a field and saw a pasture; salmon fishers see rivers and oceans in terms 
of salmon habitat; jurisdictions attempting to limit greenhouse gases look at forests as 
greenhouse gas sinks; wilderness advocates see remote places as areas ‘where the earth and its 
community of life are untrammeled by man.’”). 
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conference, my spouse and I went on a field trip to see 
the landscape. 
While the nerd-factor for me that week was already through the 
roof, the highlight of the field trip really pushed it up a notch when 
we came upon an actual commons (an honest-to-goodness, real-life 
commons!). My spouse did her best to restrain her eye rolling as I 
tried not to jump out of my seat. 
As the bus slowed down, we saw cows on the commons (there 
were actual cows on the commons!). Beyond the cows, we saw 
people on the commons in the distance. I blurted out as I stood out 
of my seat, “Are those the herders?!” I was beyond giddy. 
As the bus moved on and got closer to the people on the 
commons, we realized that they were golfing. In a moment of 
mental confusion, all I could think of was, “Why would herders 
golf?! Wait. . . . These are not herders, these are golfers.” It was hard 
to see it any other way. Golfers were right there . . . with the 
cows . . . on the commons. I was surprised to say the least, but the 
tour guide—witnessing my excitement followed by confusion—
explained it was really nothing out of the usual. 
When Hardin introduced us to the commons, he set me up for 
confusion. I blame him really. Hardin did not describe a field, he 
asked us to “[p]icture a pasture open to all.”46 There is a difference 
between fields and pastures, even though a field has geographic 
dimensions similar to those of a pasture. The main difference 
between the two is that implicit in the idea of a pasture is the 
assumption of a particular use—grazing animals.47 Grazing happens 
on the pasture, golfing on the green, and both—apparently—on a 
commons in the Cotswolds. 
While Hardin’s environmental storytelling is much celebrated 
and helpful in getting Hardin’s point across, he tells the story 
exclusively through the eyes of the herders, ignoring—as much of 
the commons literature is apt to do—that there might be competing 
uses of the field that will have to go unfilled because the herders laid 
claim to the field. The commons literature is replete with suggestions 
 
 46. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1244 (emphasis added). 
 47. A field is defined as “a land area free of woodland, cities, and towns[,]” while a 
pasture is defined as “grass or other plants grown for the feeding of grazing animals.” 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 845, 1653 (16th ed. 1986). 
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about how the herders and other commons users may avoid the 
tragedy of the commons. But we ignore other potential dimensions 
of the field that others might find appealing: a place for golfers, a 
space for picnickers, watershed managers, wildlife hunters, or 
policymakers in search of a place to grow a forest as a greenhouse 
gas sink. 
Even when a resource does not have multiple uses associated 
with it, it often has multiple dimensions. Even just focusing on 
preserving air quality, we find that there are local, regional, and even 
global dimensions to air resources. Furthermore, people value them 
for different reasons and to different degrees. For some, their 
concerns might be protecting forests from acid rain whereas others 
are concerned about the impact of pollution on asthmatics. These 
different dimensions of the commons frequently lead to connections 
between tragedies of the commons, comedies of the commons, and 
well-governed commons. 
D. The Mistake of Assuming Something Is a Pure Public Good Resource 
When we find resources that have elements of public good 
resources, we are likely to also find comedy. The main difference 
between a commons and a public good is that using a public good 
does not consume or diminish the resource.48 Very few goods 
(perhaps none) are truly public goods, but frequent examples are 
national defense49 and information.50 While there are certainly 
resources that have public-good dimensions to them, there are no 
resources where rivalry does not play some role, at least sometimes. 
Because of this, pure public-good resources do not exist. 
Where we find a resource with elements of a public good, it 
captures our attention. The problem is that we might be tempted to 
overlook aspects of the resource that, while perhaps with less allure, 
are likely to be a source of problems. At the end of the day, the 
 
 48. See Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND 
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS 13 
(Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); Fennell, supra note 10, at 919. 
 49. See, e.g., Daphne Keller, A Gaudier Future That Almost Blinds the Eye, 52 DUKE L.J. 
273, 321 (2002). 
 50. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (2004). 
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assertion that a resource cannot be consumed or be diminished is—
to use a highly technical term—hogwash. 
The notion that an assumed public good is nonrivalrous falls 
apart for a number of reasons. Sometimes this occurs because 
resources have multiple dimensions, some of which look more like 
public goods and others that look more like commons.51 Take the 
example of the gases in the Earth’s atmosphere that create the 
greenhouse effect. Emissions of greenhouse gases have often been 
characterized as a classic commons problem.52 This makes sense 
because as an individual adds greenhouse gases to the global 
atmosphere, she experiences all the benefits associated with emitting 
the gases but only bears a minuscule fraction of the costs. On the 
other hand, gases in the global atmosphere are also a textbook 
example of a public good. Greenhouse gases form a fairly uniform 
blanket around the planet that warms the entire Earth. One person’s 
experience of this additional warmth does nothing to diminish the 
greenhouse effect. 
Now, consider a recipe. It could be easily argued that this is a 
textbook public good because no matter how many times it is 
copied, it still remains undiminished for the owner.53 Some aspects of 
a recipe, however, can easily be diminished—such as the ability of a 
person to make money off of a recipe—if it is broadly shared.54 In 
other words, we see that aspects of the tragedy of the commons 
apply to recipes as well. In other work, I made the point this way: 
 
 51. See Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 48, at 14. 
 52. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global 
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 190 (2005); Richard B. 
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 
2099 (1993); Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: “Insuring” Against Global Warming, 86 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 445, 461 (1992); Thompson, supra note 7, at 253. 
 53. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of 
Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 692–93 (making this 
claim and providing an interesting example that highlight some of the complexities related to 
managing public goods). 
 54. Professor Moohr’s example, id., does not ignore these aspects of recipes but rather 
couches them as part of difficulties of managing public good resources. This characterization is 
arguably correct and certainly found in many other places when dealing with discussions of 
knowledge resources. My sense is that what is going on here is less about the complexities of 
dealing with public goods and more of a problem related commons resources. 
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While it is a bit ridiculous, consider the example of the potential 
value of the fried chicken recipe at the heart of a memorable speech 
delivered by one of Mike Myers’ characters in So I Married an Axe 
Murderer. The character could hardly contain his scorn as he 
explained at Kentucky Fried Chicken that the Colonel “puts 
addictive chemicals in his chicken, making you crave it fortnightly.” 
Had the Colonel blabbed the recipe far and wide, when the craving 
kicked in, getting out the fryer would be an alternative to paying a 
visit to the Colonel. In reality of course, addictive chemical or not, 
KFC goes to great lengths to keep the “Colonel’s Secret Recipe” a 
secret, hiding away the recipe in a vault protected by various 
motion detectors and surrounded by concrete. If the recipe got 
out, every potential customer who opted not to buy his chicken 
would illustrate for the Colonel the sting of rivalry.55 
For the Colonel, the resource of his recipe would be quite 
diminished mainly because of the way he values it has commons 
dimensions. There would certainly be those who would appreciate 
the public good aspect of the recipe being exploited more—certainly 
the father in So I Married an Axe Murderer would have: “Oh, I 
hated the Colonel with his wee beady eyes, and that smug look on 
his face. ‘Oh, you’re gonna buy my chicken! Ohhhhh!’”56 
Beyond the dual nature of public good resources, often when 
commentators invoke the concept of public good resources, what 
really is at play is a public good resource that is not currently facing a 
lot of pressure from congestion. For example, one of the most 
common examples of a public good is a highway without much 
traffic.57 At least at some level this makes sense: adding more traffic 
to the highway might have little or no effect on other potential 
users. Still, highways, and many other resources that serve as an 
adequate proxy for public goods in many instances, are of course 
prone to crowding.58 Regardless, the major point here is clear: 
focusing on the public good aspects of a resource while ignoring the 
commons dimensions of that resource is done at our own peril. 
 
 55. Brigham Daniels, Legispedia, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 445, 451–52 
(Brett M Frischmann et al. ed., 2014) (parenthesis and footnotes omitted). 
 56. SO I MARRIED AN AXE MURDERER (TriStar Pictures 1993). 
 57. Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS 
AND CLUB GOODS 273–77 (2d ed. 1996). 
 58. Id. 
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E. Tragic Institutions 
Any scholar, resource manager, or commentator who concerns 
herself with the future of a commons or the well-being of a group of 
commons users would love to have a toolbox that helps ferret out 
potential exposure to the tragedy of the commons along with tools 
to address these weaknesses. This is exactly what the scholars who 
have concerned themselves with synthesizing the volumes of case 
studies on various commons have provided us—the most well-known 
of these, of course, is Ostrom’s principles of long-enduring 
institutions,59 but similar compilations by others are also 
quite useful.60 
While much effort by other scholars has gone into uncovering 
these principles, these various compilations differ somewhat from 
scholar to scholar. What seems quite useful, but is not currently 
available in the literature, is to think about what—if anything—
unifies the principles that have been identified. It seems three 
important threads bind these principles together. 
First, many of the factors identified above can be seen as an 
attempt to provide commons users a credible commitment that they 
will reap future benefits for any sacrifices they make today. The role 
of credible commitments has been noted to resolve a host of 
problems in the commons61 and society more generally.62 The 
purpose of credible commitments in the commons is an inducement: 
we ask users of the commons to cut back and in return give a 
promise that they specifically will benefit from their sacrifice. Within 
this context, we might think about rules that clearly determine at the 
 
 59. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 88–102. 
 60. See JEAN-MARIE BALAND & JEAN-PHILIPPE PLATTEAU, HALTING DEGRADATION 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES: IS THERE A ROLE FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES? 243–45 (1996); 
ROBERT WADE, VILLAGE REPUBLICS: THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
IN INDIA 215–16 (1988); Arun Agrawal, Common Property Institutions and Sustainable 
Governance or Resources, 29 WORLD DEV. 1649, 1654 (2001); Margaret A. McKean, Success 
on the Commons: A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource 
Management, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 247 (1992). 
 61. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 43–45. 
 62. See, e.g, Kreps, 1990; North and Weingast, 1989; Williamson, 1983. In fact, and by 
no means coincidentally, Williamson was given the other half of the 2009 Nobel Prize in 
Economics for his scholarly contribution, which in large part is devoted to exploring the 
concept of credible commitments. See Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis, supra note 18. 
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outset who has rights63 to what64 and where.65 A second example is 
the principle that commons users should have the ability to 
participate meaningfully in the governance in the commons.66 It 
makes sense that this would help because we are asking commons 
users to trust that the promises made at the outset ultimately come 
to fruition. 
Providing credible commitments in the commons is often 
difficult because when it comes to cutting back in the commons, 
“temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present.”67 Without 
credible commitments, it makes sense that users of a commons are 
squeamish to cut back. As a perceptive federal judge observed more 
than one hundred years ago, “no person would engage in [labor in 
the commons] if the fruits of his labor could be appropriated by any 
chance finder.”68 Scholars of the commons have recognized that 
without credible commitments, any conservation only leaves more 
for others, making them a “sucker”69 or a “patsy.”70 
A second theme that binds many of the factors that make a 
difference in warding off the tragedy of the commons is that they 
attempt to provide credible threats aimed at those tempted to 
circumvent the rules of the game. Credible threats are just the flip 
side of the coin used to make credible commitments. Just as is the 
case with credible commitments, there is a rich literature that 
explores credible threats.71 
 
 63. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 91; McKean, supra note 60, at 258, 263;. WADE, 
supra note 60, at 215; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654. 
 64. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 91–92; McKean, supra note 60, at 264–66. 
 65. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 91–92; WADE, supra note 60, at 215; BALAND & 
PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 344; Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654. 
 66. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 93–94; BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 60, at 344; 
Agrawal, supra note 60, at 1654 
 67. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 15. 
 68. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881). 
 69. See OSTROM, supra note 3, at 17, 35 (citing fears of being the “sucker”). 
 70. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 242 (“Because no one can bind anyone else’s 
actions, not consuming simply makes one a patsy.”). 
 71. See THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). Schelling’s 
contribution to the literature on credible threats is in large part why he also won a Nobel Prize 
in economics. The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis, The Prize in Economic Sciences 2005—Robert 
Aumann’s and Thomas Schelling’s Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and 
Cooperation, NOBEL PRIZE 3 (Oct. 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/advanced-
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The need for compliance and the importance of excluding those 
without rights are themes that run through the principles scholars 
have identified. It is not surprising that some of the principles 
include making monitoring as easy as possible and devoting 
resources to ensure monitoring is effective,72 escalate sanctions,73 and 
set out the rules of dispute resolution.74 If consequences do not 
follow the violation of any commitment made in the commons, it is 
hard to say how we could call such a promise “credible”; credible 
threats are part and parcel of making commitments.75 
The third thread that runs through these factors is the value of 
low transaction costs in securing cooperation in the commons. The 
importance of transaction costs in determining the success of 
collective action is well documented.76 Note that some of the factors 
identified by commons scholars are matters of institutional design 
and within the grasp of those attempting to govern the commons to 
change. Examples include the use of nested enterprises within large 
and complex commons resources77 and giving resource users 
management responsibilities over the commons.78 Some other 
factors are just a reflection that the situation in some commons 
resources is more optimal than in others for reasons generally 
difficult to foster. Smaller resources are easier to manage than larger 
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resources.79 It helps when these are part of a tight-knit community 
or the commons users at least have a shared set of values.80 
While one may take a more nuanced view of these principles, as 
the many principles discussed above illustrate, these three categories 
are useful not only because they encapsulate all of the principles, but 
also because they provide a rationale for why factors of successful 
commons are factors in the first place. Credible commitments and 
threats help commons users meet the challenges posed by the 
tragedy of the commons; they work together to assure that sacrifices 
made by users today will benefit them specifically in the future and 
not just another user of the commons. Coordination of collective 
action helps promote cooperation in a circumstance where many 
would be tempted to free ride. They also reduce the costs of users 
governing a commons in the first place. 
While the literature places the role of these principles in a very 
optimistic light, credible commitments and threats along with 
reduced collective action costs not only provide stability but also risk 
introducing entrenchment. While these principles certainly provide 
an answer to the tragedy of the commons, they also create problems 
in themselves by creating barriers for those committed to extract 
rival values from the commons. Solving the tragedy of the commons 
does little to address the foreseeable conflicts among competing 
uses. More and more, fights in the commons concern not only the 
problem of overconsumption by a particular kind of user, but also 
the push and pull of entirely different competing uses. 
Whenever we commit to manage a commons for the benefit of a 
particular set of users, we often lock out potential rivals and make 
change more costly. In this way, stability can become rigidity. I have 
argued in the past that just as the tragedy of the commons 
continually crops up in diverse commons, the problem of competing 
uses continues to reappear.81 Because commons resources are 
complex and can be used for many purposes, it is typical that when 
we attempt to solve a problem in the commons, we find that laws 
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and policies put in place to solve past problems complicate our 
efforts and may in fact be the very source of our frustrations.82 
Managers of the commons are well acquainted with attempts to 
push the commons in one direction or pull it in another. Should we 
protect owl habitat or allow loggers to cut down trees? Should our 
sidewalks be open to vendors, reserved for walkers, or a place for the 
homeless to sleep? Should coastal wetlands be drained for 
development, protected for wildlife, or valued for flood control? The 
number of competing pressures vying for the commons within our 
forests, rivers, cityscapes, the radio spectrum, and even the global 
atmosphere highlight such tensions. 
The problem of competing uses of the commons is not as simple 
as it appears. There is more going on than an us-against-them 
problem. The nature of the commons actually lends itself not only to 
competing values but also entrenched interests. Very often, when we 
try to solve a tragedy of the commons, we not only address a 
problem but make a commitment to value a commons in a certain 
way: forests are for logging; sidewalks are available for vendors to 
use; wetlands are for wildlife. Whenever we commit to manage a 
commons for the benefit of a particular set of users, we often lock 
out potential rivals and make change more difficult. In this way, the 
stability that Ostrom’s long-enduring institutions celebrate for rival 
users seems more like rigidity and barriers to change. 
An example that highlights these concerns is the important role 
and evolution of voluntary associations of irrigators in the arid 
West.83 Originally these irrigation systems were designed to promote 
cooperation among many water users; water districts brought people 
together and created rules to govern users long before legislatures 
and courts even considered asserting government power in this 
area.84 In the 1800s, these water districts changed much of the West 
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from uninhabitable deserts to locations where settlers could develop 
towns and cities. 
While irrigation companies depend on and continue to promote 
cooperation among water users, they also have become a vehicle to 
channel lobbying efforts designed to protect their water use rights 
and otherwise maintain the status quo.85 From the perspective of 
incumbent water users, the need for a unified front has grown. 
Today, the West is increasingly concerned with providing water to 
burgeoning cities and more interested in using water to satisfy 
environmental, esthetic, and recreational values. What we find is that 
the methods that allowed for governance over a commons resource 
in one era now serve to complicate governing the commons today. 
In the commons, the seeds of conflict are often sown in the 
accomplishments of the past. 
CONCLUSION 
While the stories we tell and retell about the commons have 
elements of tragedy and of comedy, it turns out that these stories 
have elements that tie them together and that often we find elements 
of tragedy and comedy coexisting. On one hand, we find that 
commons resources are plagued with challenges, most of which can 
be traced back to the internal characteristics of the commons—the 
nature of the resource, the traits of its users, the way the commons is 
governed, and the value placed on the commons resource. At the 
same time, we find that through governance there is at least hope 
that we can overcome these internal challenges and this inertia. Even 
though the storyline is very difficult to alter, it is ours to write. 
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